Foundations of Science 18 (1):139-148 (2013)
|Abstract||I present a formal ontological theory where the basic building blocks of the world can be either things or events. In any case, the result is a Parmenidean worldview where change is not a global property. What we understand by change manifests as asymmetries in the pattern of the world-lines that constitute 4-dimensional existents. I maintain that such a view is in accord with current scientific knowledge|
|Keywords||Change Events Formal ontology Spacetime Pre-socratics|
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