First-person thought and the use of ‘I’

Synthese 163 (2):145-156 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The traditional account of first-person thought draws conclusions about this type of thinking from claims made about the first-person pronoun. In this paper I raise a worry for the traditional account. Certain uses of 'I' conflict with its conception of the linguistic data. I argue that once the data is analysed correctly, the traditional approach to first-person thought cannot be maintained.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

First Person Thought.François Recanati - 2014 - In Julien Dutant, Davide Fassion & Anne Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. pp. 506-511.
Thought in Action.Komarine Romdenh-Romluc - 2012 - In Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Second person thought.Jane Heal - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):317-331.
The You Turn.Naomi Eilan - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):265-278.
Misleading indexicals.Brian Weatherson - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):308–310.
On Thought Insertion.Rachel Gunn - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):559-575.
Merging second-person and first-person neuroscience.Matthew R. Longo & Manos Tsakiris - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):429-430.
Philosophy of mind.Constantine Sandis & Komarine Romdenh-Romluc - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (2):170-174.
Philosophy of mind.Komarine Romdenh‐Romluc Constantine Sandis - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (2):170-174.
You and me.Guy Longworth - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):289-303.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
171 (#110,137)

6 months
12 (#200,125)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Komarine Romdenh-Romluc
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
I Am Still Not Here Now.Stefano Predelli - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):289-303.
Shifting Perspective on Indexicals.Mark Bowker - 2022 - Pragmatics 32 (4):518-536.
First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 273-296.
Names, Descriptions, and Assertion.Ray Buchanan - 2014 - In Zsu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer. pp. 03-15.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Self-reference and self-awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.

View all 16 references / Add more references