Meaning shifts and Conditioning

Abstract
This paper investigates the viability of the Bayesian model of belief change. Van Benthem (2003) has shown that a particular kind of information change typical for dynamic epistemic logic cannot be modelled by Bayesian conditioning. I argue that the problems described by van Benthem come about because the information change alters the semantics in which the change is supposed to be modelled by conditioning: it induces a shift in meanings. I then show that meaning shifts can be modelled in terms of conditioning by employing a semantics that makes these changes in meaning explicit, and that the appropriate probability kinematics can be described by Dempster’s rule. The new model thereby facilitates a better understanding between probabilistic epistemology and dynamic epistemic logic
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,365
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Glenn Shafer (1981). Jeffrey's Rule of Conditioning. Philosophy of Science 48 (3):337-362.
Carl Wagner (2013). Is Conditioning Really Incompatible with Holism? Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):409-414.
Barteld P. Kooi (2003). Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (4):381-408.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-08-14

Total downloads

26 ( #68,072 of 1,102,753 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #296,987 of 1,102,753 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.