Meaning shifts and Conditioning
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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This paper investigates the viability of the Bayesian model of belief change. Van Benthem (2003) has shown that a particular kind of information change typical for dynamic epistemic logic cannot be modelled by Bayesian conditioning. I argue that the problems described by van Benthem come about because the information change alters the semantics in which the change is supposed to be modelled by conditioning: it induces a shift in meanings. I then show that meaning shifts can be modelled in terms of conditioning by employing a semantics that makes these changes in meaning explicit, and that the appropriate probability kinematics can be described by Dempster’s rule. The new model thereby facilitates a better understanding between probabilistic epistemology and dynamic epistemic logic
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