David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (2):103-113 (2012)
We present a formal analysis of the Cosmological Argument in its two main forms: that due to Aquinas, and the revised version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument more recently advocated by William Lane Craig. We formulate these two arguments in such a way that each conclusion follows in first-order logic from the corresponding assumptions. Our analysis shows that the conclusion which follows for Aquinas is considerably weaker than what his aims demand. With formalizations that are logically valid in hand, we reinterpret the natural language versions of the premises and conclusions in terms of concepts of causality consistent with (and used in) recent work in cosmology done by physicists. In brief: the Kalam argument commits the fallacy of equivocation in a way that seems beyond repair; two of the premises adopted by Aquinas seem dubious when the terms ‘cause’ and ‘causality’ are interpreted in the context of contemporary empirical science. Thus, while there are no problems with whether the conclusions follow logically from their assumptions, the Kalam argument is not viable, and the Aquinas argument does not imply a caused origination of the universe. The assumptions of the latter are at best less than obvious relative to recent work in the sciences. We conclude with mention of a new argument that makes some positive modifications to an alternative variation on Aquinas by Le Poidevin, which nonetheless seems rather weak.
|Keywords||Causality Cosmology Theology Semantics|
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Swinburne (2004). The Existence of God. Oxford University Press.
Mario Augusto Bunge (1979). Causality and Modern Science. Dover Publications.
William Lane Craig (2002). The Kalam Cosmological Argument. In Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie. Rutgers University Press 383-383.
William Lane Craig & Quentin Smith (1993). Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology. Oxford University Press.
William L. Rowe (1971/1998). The Cosmological Argument. Noûs 5 (1):49-61.
Citations of this work BETA
Gustavo E. Romero (forthcoming). Sufficient Reason and Reason Enough. Foundations of Science:1-6.
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