Time for consciousness: intention and introspection [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):369-376 (2011)
We assume that we can act—in at least some cases—by consciously intending to do so. Wegner (2002) appeals to empirical research carried out by Libet et al. (1983) to challenge this assumption. I argue that his conclusion presupposes a particular view of conscious intention. But there is an alternative model available, which has been developed by various writers in the phenomenological tradition, and most recently defended by Moran (2001). If we adopt this alternative account of conscious intention, Wegner’s argument no longer goes through, and we can retain the claim that our conscious intentions can give rise to action
|Keywords||Action Intention Introspection - Libet Wegner|
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References found in this work BETA
Richard A. Moran (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
Benjamin Libet, C. Gleason, E. Wright & D. Pearl (1983). Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential). The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act. Brain 106:623--664.
René Descartes (1996). Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections From the Objections and Replies. Cambridge University Press.
Donald M. MacKay (1985). Do We “Control” Our Brains? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):546-546.
David M. Armstrong (1963). Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible? Philosophical Review 62 (4):417-32.
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