Time for consciousness: intention and introspection [Book Review]

Abstract
We assume that we can act—in at least some cases—by consciously intending to do so. Wegner (2002) appeals to empirical research carried out by Libet et al. (1983) to challenge this assumption. I argue that his conclusion presupposes a particular view of conscious intention. But there is an alternative model available, which has been developed by various writers in the phenomenological tradition, and most recently defended by Moran (2001). If we adopt this alternative account of conscious intention, Wegner’s argument no longer goes through, and we can retain the claim that our conscious intentions can give rise to action
Keywords Action  Intention  Introspection - Libet  Wegner
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,738
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 9 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Neil Levy (2005). Libet's Impossible Demand. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):67-76.
Sarah K. Paul (2012). How We Know What We Intend. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.
J. David Velleman (1997). How To Share An Intention. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29 - 50.
Raimo Tuomela (2005). We-Intentions Revisited. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
Patrick Haggard (2005). Conscious Intention and Motor Cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):290-295.
Darrell Cole (2011). War and Intention. Journal of Military Ethics 10 (3):174-191.
Alfred R. Mele (1987). Are Intentions Self-Referential? Philosophical Studies 52 (3):309-329.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-03-14

Total downloads

57 ( #26,544 of 1,098,668 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #57,338 of 1,098,668 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.