David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (3):153-160 (1998)
The paper is devoted to the discussion of some philosophical and historical problems connected with the theorem on the undefinability of the notion of truth. In particular the problem of the priority of proving this theorem will be considered. It is claimed that Tarski obtained this theorem independently though he made clear his indebtedness to Gödel?s methods. On the other hand, Gödel was aware of the formal undefinability of truth in 1931, but he did not publish this result. Reasons for that are also considered
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Srećko Kovač (2008). Gödel, Kant, and the Path of a Science. Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):147-169.
Stanisław Krajewski (2004). Gödel on Tarski. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 127 (1-3):303-323.
Similar books and articles
Susan Haack (1976). Is It True What They Say About Tarski? Philosophy 51 (197):323 - 336.
David DeVidi & Graham Solomon (1999). Tarski on “Essentially Richer” Metalanguages. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):1-28.
Luis Fernández Moreno (2001). Tarskian Truth and the Correspondence Theory. Synthese 126 (1-2):123 - 147.
Peter Milne (1999). Tarski, Truth and Model Theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):141–167.
John F. Fox (1989). What Were Tarski's Truth-Definitions For? History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (2):165-179.
Greg Frost-Arnold (2004). Was Tarski's Theory of Truth Motivated by Physicalism? History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):265-280.
Panu Raatikainen (2003). More on Putnam and Tarski. Synthese 135 (1):37 - 47.
Juliet Floyd (2001). Prose Versus Proof: Wittgenstein on Gödel, Tarski and Truth. Philosophia Mathematica 9 (3):280-307.
Dale Jacquette (2010). Circularity or Lacunae in Tarski's Truth-Schemata. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):315-326.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads26 ( #98,086 of 1,696,808 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #346,744 of 1,696,808 )
How can I increase my downloads?