Humean Motivation and Humean Rationality

Philosophical Studies 79 (1):37 - 57 (1995)
Abstract
The paper examines the Humean Theory of Motivation as a reason to accept an instrumental conception of rationality, and Michael Smith's "direction of fit" arguments for the Humean theory. These arguments must show that there can be no desires, attitudes that combine the functional roles of belief and desire by both responding to evidence and motivating action. Because of rationality constraints on the proper attribution of attitudes the issue turns on the correct theory of rationality. Thus, arguments for the Humean Theory of Motivation must presuppose a Humean or instrumental theory of rationality
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References found in this work BETA
Nagel (1970). Possibility of Altruism. Princeton University Press.

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