Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (2):259 - 271 (1977)
|Abstract||Nelson Goodman claims to have given us a criterion for likeness of meaning that is more stringent than simple coextensiveness and yet that avoids the familiar extentionalist objections. The notion of a nominal compound plays a key role in his account. I show that Goodman's comments concerning this notion are inadequate, that his comments concerning expressions like unicorn-picture are subject to two serious objections: (1) they don't support his claims about likeness of meaning (i.e., the claims that his criterion is more stringent than simple coextensiveness) and (2) they make English an unlearnable language.|
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