David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (4):493 - 527 (2004)
In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressions typically get an (un)marked interpretation: <span class='Hi'>Horn</span>'s division of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is a conventional fact that we use language this way. This convention will be explained in terms of the equilibria of signalling games introduced by Lewis (1969), but now in an evolutionary setting. I will also relate this signalling game analysis with Parikh's (1991, 2000, 2001) game-theoretical analysis of successful communication, which in turn is compared with Blutner's: 2000) bi-directional optimality theory.
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