Akratic Believers

American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (2):175-183 (1983)
A person has performed an action akratically when he intentionally, voluntarily acts contrary to what he thinks, all things considered, is best to do. This is very misleadingly called weakness of the will; less misleadingly, akrasia of action. I should like to show that there is intellectual as well as practical akrasia. This might, equally misleadingly, be called weakness of belief; less misleadingly, akrasia of belief.
Keywords epistemic akrasia
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 14,850
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Robert Dunn (1992). Akratic Attitudes and Rationality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):24 – 39.
Brian Mclaughlin (1988). Mele's Irrationality: A Commentary. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):189 – 200.
Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

98 ( #22,011 of 1,707,789 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #266,392 of 1,707,789 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.