David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (2):175-183 (1983)
A person has performed an action akratically when he intentionally, voluntarily acts contrary to what he thinks, all things considered, is best to do. This is very misleadingly called weakness of the will; less misleadingly, akrasia of action. I should like to show that there is intellectual as well as practical akrasia. This might, equally misleadingly, be called weakness of belief; less misleadingly, akrasia of belief.
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Citations of this work BETA
Alvaro Sandroni (2011). Akrasia, Instincts and Revealed Preferences. Synthese 181 (1):1 - 17.
J. Christopher Maloney (1990). It's Hard to Believe. Mind and Language 5 (2):122-48.
Brian Mclaughlin (1988). Mele's Irrationality: A Commentary. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):189 – 200.
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