Akratic Believers

American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (2):175-183 (1983)
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Abstract

A person has performed an action akratically when he intentionally, voluntarily acts contrary to what he thinks, all things considered, is best to do. This is very misleadingly called weakness of the will; less misleadingly, akrasia of action. I should like to show that there is intellectual as well as practical akrasia. This might, equally misleadingly, be called weakness of belief; less misleadingly, akrasia of belief.

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Author's Profile

Amelie Rorty
PhD: Yale University; Last affiliation: Boston University

Citations of this work

Self-deception.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The spontaneity of emotion.Jean Moritz Müller - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):1060-1078.
Perspectives on Self-Deception.Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.) - 1988 - University of California Press.
Akratic believing?Jonathan E. Adler - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.
Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief.Eugene Chislenko - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):669-690.

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