Agnosticism as a third stance

Mind 116 (461):55-104 (2007)
Within certain philosophical debates, most notably those concerning the limits of our knowledge, agnosticism seems a plausible, and potentially the right, stance to take. Yet, in order to qualify as a proper stance, and not just the refusal to adopt any, agnosticism must be shown to be in opposition to both endorsement and denial and to be answerable to future evidence. This paper explicates and defends the thesis that agnosticism may indeed define such a third stance that is weaker than scepticism and hence offers a genuine alternative to realism and anti-realism about our cognitive limits.
Keywords agnosticism
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzm055
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Sven Rosenkranz (2012). Radical Scepticism Without Epistemic Closure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):692-718.

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