David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):633–659 (2008)
This paper provides a novel argument against conceptualism, the claim that the content of human experience, including perceptual experience, is entirely conceptual. Conceptualism entails that the content of experience is limited by the concepts that we possess and deploy. I present an argument to show that such a view is exceedingly costly—if the nature of our experience is entirely conceptual, then we cannot account for concept learning: all perceptual concepts must be innate. The version of nativism that results is incompatible with naturalistic accounts of concept learning. This cost can be avoided, and concept learning accounted for if nonconceptual content of experience is admitted.
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John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman (2011). A New Framework for Conceptualism. Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.
Jon Altschul (2012). Entitlement, Justification, and the Bootstrapping Problem. Acta Analytica 27 (4):345-366.
Adina L. Roskies (2010). 'That' Response Doesn't Work: Against a Demonstrative Defense of Conceptualism. Noûs 44 (1):112-134.
Kristina Musholt (2013). Self-Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):649-672.
James Van Cleve (2012). Defining and Defending Nonconceptual Contents and States. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):411-430.
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