A Problem for Fictionalism about Possible Worlds

Analysis 53 (2):71 - 81 (1993)
Fictionalism about possible worlds is the view that talk about worlds in the analysis of modality is to be construed as ontologically innocent discourse about the content of a fiction. Versions of the view have been defended by D M Armstrong (in "A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility") and by myself (in "Modal Fictionalism', "Mind" 99, July 1990). The present note argues that fictionalist accounts of modality (both Armstrong's version and my own) fail to serve the fictionalists ontological purposes because they imply that as a matter of necessity there exist many worlds
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DOI 10.1093/analys/53.2.71
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Chad Carmichael (2010). Universals. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):373-389.
Frederick Kroon (2011). Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass 6 (11):786-803.

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