All roads lead to violations of countable additivity
Philosophical Studies 161 (3):381-390 (2012)
| Abstract | This paper defends the claim that there is a deep tension between the principle of countable additivity and the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. The claim that such a tension exists has recently been challenged by Brian Weatherson, who has attempted to provide a countable additivity-friendly argument for the one-third solution. This attempt is shown to be unsuccessful. And it is argued that the failure of this attempt sheds light on the status of the principle of indifference that underlies the tension between countable additivity and the one-third solution. | |||||||||
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