In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan (2002)
|Abstract||The problem of consciousness is to say what it is for some of our thoughts, feelings, and sensations to be conscious, given that others are not. This is different from saying what it is for a person to be conscious or not conscious. Even when people are conscious, many of their thoughts and sensations typically are not. And there's nothing problematic about a person's being conscious; it's just the person's being awake and responsive to sensory input|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
José Luis Bermúdez (2000). Consciousness, Higher-Order Thought, and Stimulus Reinforcement. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):194-195.
David M. Rosenthal (1997). A Theory of Consciousness. In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. Mit Press.
Ned Block (2011). The Higher Order Approach to Consciousness is Defunct. Analysis 71 (3):419-431.
Robert Francescotti (1995). Higher-Order Thoughts and Conscious Experience. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):239-254.
Neil Campbell Manson (2002). What Does Language Tell Us About Consciousness? First-Person Mental Discourse and Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):221 – 238.
David Rosenthal (2002). The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness.
David Rosenthal (2005). The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
David M. Rosenthal (2002). The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads85 ( #8,695 of 549,198 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,418 of 549,198 )
How can I increase my downloads?