Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (July):227-251 (2002)
|Abstract||Everyone — or almost everyone — was agreed that what is [mental] … has a common quality in which its essence is expressed: namely the quality of being conscious — unique, indescribable, but needing no description. All that is conscious … is [mental], and conversely all that is [mental] is conscious; that is self-evident and to contradict it is nonsense|
|Keywords||Consciousness Metaphysics Mind Psychoanalysis Freud|
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