David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (July):227-251 (2002)
Everyone — or almost everyone — was agreed that what is [mental] … has a common quality in which its essence is expressed: namely the quality of being conscious — unique, indescribable, but needing no description. All that is conscious … is [mental], and conversely all that is [mental] is conscious; that is self-evident and to contradict it is nonsense
|Keywords||Consciousness Metaphysics Mind Psychoanalysis Freud|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Robert W. Lurz (2003). Advancing the Debate Between HOT and FO Accounts of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:23-44.
P. S. Herzog (1991). Conscious and Unconscious: Freud's Dynamic Distinction Reconsidered. International Universities Press.
David M. Rosenthal (1993). Explaining Consciousness. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Oup. 406--421.
Gilberto Gomes (1995). Self-Awareness and the Mind-Brain Problem. Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):155-65.
Uriah Kriegel (2004). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
Michel Ferrari & Adrien Pinard (2006). Death and Resurrection of a Disciplined Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):75-96.
Thomas Natsoulas (2000). Freud and Consciousness: X. The Place of Consciousness in Freud's Science. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 23 (4):525-561.
Neil Campbell Manson (2000). State Consciousness and Creature Consciousness: A Real Distinction. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):405-410.
Max Velmans (1990). Is the Mind Conscious, Functional or Both? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.
David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads31 ( #57,439 of 1,103,048 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #297,567 of 1,103,048 )
How can I increase my downloads?