Cidadania Liberal e Reconhecimento Cultural

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 59 (1):171 - 183 (2003)
Abstract
Este artigo coloca o problema da relação entre a concepção liberal da cidadania, definida por um conjunto igual de direitos e deveres, e a necessidade de acomodar o reconhecimento das diferentes comunidades culturais. Duas respostas divergentes são apresentadas: uma de carácter abstractizante - a de John Rawls - e outra de tipo multiculturalista - a de Will Kymlicka. De seguida, essas respostas são avaliadas. Segundo o autor do artigo, a diferenciação do conceito de cidadania liberal mediante a atribuição de direitos multiculturais proposta por Kymlicka funda-se numa concepção equívoca do significado do bem da pertença cultural. A solução de Rawls acaba por afigurar-se mais robusta na medida em que encerra recursos conceptuais de adaptação à compreensão do carácter mesclado e aberto do bem da pertença cultural. O autor do artigo, no entanto, também reconhece a necessidade de acomodar, num quadro democrático, o desacordo sobre a justa definição da cidadania liberal que opensamento dos dois pensadores estudados patenteia. /// This article deals with the challenge of accommodating the demands for recognition of different cultural communities with the liberal conception of equal citizenship. The view that disconnects recognition from cultural membership is exemplified by the work of John Rawls. By contrast, the view that incorporates cultural recognition in the idea of liberal equality is exemplified by the work of Will Kymlicka. The author of the article argues that Kymlicka's account of cultural belonging as a social primary good is not strong enough to support his own argument for minority rights. The approach of Rawls is better equipped to deal with cultural diversity precisely because it implies a looser conception of cultural belonging, which fits better the liberal view. Nevertheless, the article concludes, the "dispute" between Rawls and Kymlicka is a good example of real moral disagreement and it shows that our theories of justice need to be complemented by a concept of democracy.
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