Graduate studies at Western
Consciousness And Cognition 10 (1):85-93 (2001)
|Abstract||Color subjectivism is the view that color properties are mental properties of our visual sensations, perhaps identical with properties of neural states, and that nothing except visual sensations and other mental states exhibits color properties. Color phys- icalism, by contrast, holds that colors are exclusively properties of visible physical objects and processes|
|Keywords||*Color Perception *Philosophies *Subjectivity|
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