Evolutionary game theory and the normative theory of institutional design: Binmore and behavioral economics
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (1):51-79 (2006)
In this article, I critically respond to Herbert Gintis's criticisms of the behavioral-economic foundations of Ken Binmore's game-theoretic theory of justice. Gintis, I argue, fails to take full account of the normative requirements Binmore sets for his account, and also ignores what I call the scale-relativity considerations built into Binmore's approach to modeling human evolution. Paul Seabright's criticism of Binmore, I note, repeats these oversights. In the course of answering Gintis's and Seabright's objections, I clarify and extend Binmore's theory in a number of respects, integrating it with Kim Sterelny's and Don Ross's recent (respective) work on the evolution of people as cultural entities. The account also yields a novel basis for choosing between socialism (broadly conceived) and what Binmore calls whiggery as normative political programs. Key Words: theory of justice bargaining theory evolutionary game theory human evolution Ken Binmore Herbert Gintis Kim Sterelny.
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Citations of this work BETA
Don Ross (2012). What Can Economics Contribute to the Study of Human Evolution? Biology and Philosophy 27 (2):287-297.
Don Ross (2006). Cooperation on Multiple Scales: Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation Peter Hammerstein, Editor Cambridge, MA : MIT Press , 2003 (485 + Xiv Pp; $47.00 Hbk; ISBN 0-262-08326-4). [REVIEW] Biological Theory 1 (4):428-430.
Kim Sterelny (2011). Civilizing Cooperation: Paul Seabright and the Company of Strangers. Biological Theory 6 (2):120-126.
Francesco Guala (2012). Reciprocity: Weak or Strong? What Punishment Experiments Do (and Do Not) Demonstrate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (1):1-15.
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