Explaining motivated desires

Topoi 21 (1-2):199-207 (2002)
Abstract
I examine a dispute about the nature of practical reason, and in particular moral reason, generated by Thomas Nagel's proposal of an internalist rationalism which claims we can explain motivation in terms of reason and belief alone. In opposition, Humeans contend that such explanations must also appeal to further desires. Arguments on either side of this debate typically assume that a rationalist or Humean conclusion can be reached independently of a claim about the nature of moral judgment. I'll maintain, to the contrary, that a resolution of this dispute can only be achieved on the basis of such a claim.
Keywords Desire  Ethics  Motivation  Practical Reason  Hume  Smith, M
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