Online research in philosophy

In addressing phenotypic evolution, this article reconsiders natural selection, random drift, developmental constraints, and internal selection in the new extended context of evolutionary developmental biology. The change of perspective from the "evolution of phenotypes" toward an "evolution of ontogenies" (evo-devo perspective) affects the reciprocal relationships among these different processes. Random drift and natural selection are sibling processes: two forms of post-productional sorting among alternative developmental trajectories, the former random, the latter nonrandom. Developmental constraint is a compound concept; it contains even some forms of natural ("external" and "internal") selection. A narrower definition ("reproductive constraints") is proposed. Internal selection is not a selection caused by an internal agent. It is a form of environment-independent selection depending on the level of the organism's internal developmental or functional coordination. Selection and constraints are the main deterministic processes in phenotypic evolution but they are not opposing forces. Indeed, they are continuously interacting processes of evolutionary change, but with different roles that should not be confused.

In addressing phenotypic evolution, this article reconsiders natural selection, random drift, developmental constraints, and internal selection in the new extended context of evolutionary developmental biology. The change of perspective from the "evolution of phenotypes" toward an "evolution of ontogenies" (evo-devo perspective) affects the reciprocal relationships among these different processes. Random drift and natural selection are sibling processes: two forms of post-productional sorting among alternative developmental trajectories, the former random, the latter nonrandom. Developmental constraint is a compound concept; it contains even some forms of natural ("external" and "internal") selection. A narrower definition ("reproductive constraints") is proposed. Internal selection is not a selection caused by an internal agent. It is a form of environment-independent selection depending on the level of the organism's internal developmental or functional coordination. Selection and constraints are the main deterministic processes in phenotypic evolution but they are not opposing forces. Indeed, they are continuously interacting processes of evolutionary change, but with different roles that should not be confused.

Human evolution explains how we have found ourselves in the wrong place at the wrong time. Issues of modern living; depression, obesity, and environmental destruction, can be understood in relation to our evolutionary past. This book shows how an awareness of this past and its relation to the present can help limit their impact on the future.

This article explores the role of organizational professionals in the evolutionary development of business. Such professionals are currently defined in the fields of human resources development, organizational development and human performance improvement as executive and strategic coaches, training professionals and consultants. Their work seeks to improve the human systems on which organizational processes depend. This article explores (a) areas of convergence and divergence among these fields; (b) how these professions might contribute to the conscious evolution of humane, sustainable and viable organizational cultures; and (c) the challenges and issues these professions must effectively address.

Context: Ernst von Glasersfeld collaborated with the Italian Operational School from the early 1960s when the project on the mechanization of higher human activities began. Problem: To analyze the cognitive processes in terms of a mnemonic-attentional dynamic and to study every thought content in light of the interdependence between observer and observed. Method: The project comprised two research areas: the linguistic translation, in which von Glasersfeld participated; and the semantic analysis of words, in which I participated. The common basis was the analysis of attentional dynamisms. This allowed the syntactic complexity of a sentence to be transferred to the correlational structure of the thought. The semantic analysis, especially of the observational words, was based on the attentional dynamisms used for the categorization, perception, and representation processes. Results: The analysis of visual processes led to the “constitutive structures.” These structures allowed me to establish an operative didactic based on the awareness of mental operations. Implications: The comparison between von Glasersfeld’s and my experiences revealed the equivalence of some analyses, which was due to the common presumption that the experiential units depend on the operation performed by the perceiver.

& Awareness of change within a visual scene only occurs in subjects were aware of, replicated those attentional effects, but the presence of focused attention. When two versions of a.

In addressing thescientific study of consciousness, Crick and Koch state, It is probable that at any moment some active neuronal processes in your head correlate with consciousness, while others do not: what is the difference between them? (1998, p. 97). Evidence from electrophysiological and brain-imaging studies of binocular rivalry supports the premise of this statement and answers to some extent, the question posed. I discuss these recent developments and outline the rationale and experimental evidence for the interhemispheric switch hypothesis of perceptual rivalry. According to this model, the perceptual alternations of rivalry reflect hemispheric alternations, suggesting that visual consciousness of rivalling stimuli may be unihemispheric at any one time (Miller et al., 2000). However, in this paper, I suggest that interhemispheric switching could involve alternating unihemispheric attentional selection of neuronal processes for access to visual consciousness. On this view, visual consciousness during rivalry could be bi hemispheric because the processes constitutive of attentional selection may be distinct from those constitutive of visual consciousness. This is a special case of the important distinction between the neuronal correlates and constitution of visual consciousness.

This commentary centres around the system of human visual attention. Although generally supportive of the position advocated in the target article, we suggest that the detailed account overestimates the capacities of active human vision. Limitations of peripheral search and saccadic accuracy are discussed in relation to the division of labour between covert and overt attentional processes.

Attentional character is a way of thinking about what is relevant in a human life, what is meaningful and how it becomes so. This paper introduces the concept of attentional character through a redefinition of attentional capture as achievement. It looks freshly at the attentional capture debate in the current cognitive sciences literature through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch’s gestalt-phenomenology. Attentional character is defined as an initially limited capacity for attending in a given environment and is located within the sphere of attention, primarily as an irrelevant centering in attending.