David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):575-599 (2010)
I propose a strategy for a metaphysical reduction of perceived color, that is, an identification of perceived color with properties characterizable in non-qualitative terms. According to this strategy, a description of visual experience of color, which incorporates a description of the appearance of color, is a reference-fixing description. This strategy both takes color appearance seriously in its primary epistemic role and avoids rendering color as metaphysically mysterious. I’ll also argue that given this strategy, a plausible account of perceived color claims that colors are physical properties of physical objects.
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
Jaegwon Kim (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.
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