David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Issues 20 (1):368-393 (2010)
It’s often held that undetectable inversion of mental qualities is, if not possible, at least conceivable. It’s thought to be conceivable that the mental quality your visual states exhibit when you see something red in standard conditions is literally of the same type as the mental quality my visual states exhibit when I see something green in such circumstances. It’s thought, moreover, to be conceivable that such inversion of mental qualities could be wholly undetectable by any third-person means. And since first- person access is limited to a single individual, and so could not reveal a disparity in mental quality between us, third-person undetectability means undetectability tout court
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Ian Phillips (2015). Consciousness and Criterion: On Block's Case for Unconscious Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
Todd Ganson (2013). Are Color Experiences Representational? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
Jacob Berger (2015). The Sensory Content of Perceptual Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):446-468.
Jake Quilty‐Dunn (2015). Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.
Andreas Keller & Benjamin D. Young (2014). Olfactory Consciousness Across Disciplines. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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