David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Investigations 27 (4):370–379 (2004)
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have argued that there is no fundamental distinction between what Gilbert Ryle famously called 'knowing how' and 'knowing that', and that the former can be treated as a special kind of the latter. I will endeavour to show that sentences of the form 'a knows how to F' are ambiguous between a reading in which we ascribe knowledge-that to a and another in which we ascribe something to a which is irreducible to any kind of knowledge-that and can most appropriately be characterized as an ability. The authors' attempt to reduce also the latter reading to an ascription of knowledge-that fails because it rests on an unexplained conception of practical modes of presentation.
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Citations of this work BETA
Eva-Maria Jung & Albert Newen (2010). Knowledge and Abilities: The Need for a New Understanding of Knowing-How. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):113-131.
John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (2007). Know-How and Concept Possession. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
Greg Sax (2010). Having Know-How: Intellect, Action, and Recent Work on Ryle's Distinction Between Knowledge-How and Knowledge-That. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):507-530.
Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley (2005). II Reply by Jason Stanley. Hornsby on the Phenomenology of Speech. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):131–145.
Ephraim Glick (2011). Two Methodologies for Evaluating Intellectualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):398-434.
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