Graduate studies at Western
Inquiry 41 (1):3-20 (1998)
|Abstract||Taking exception to Gilbert Ryle's influentially ironical remark about introspection, that it would be like peering into a 'windowless chamber illuminated by a very peculiar sort of light, and one to which only he [the one attempting the introspecting] has access', this essay claims that introspective awareness of one's actions and motivations in their chronological sequence is not empty but highly informative, not trivial but inseparable from any significant life, and not hopeless but entirely feasible. It is argued that informative and significant introspective awareness is a practice which ought to be as unbroken as possible, not fetched into consciousness or dismissed therefrom at whim in discrete quanta. Philosophers of mind for whom self-awareness is a surd will, however, naturally be inclined to attend to it reluctantly, thus without the requisite persistence, and without understanding it to be a skilled practice. This essay offers a preliminary map of the territory of introspection, which it defines under the heading of 'inner space and inner time.' It shows what sorts of conceptual clarifications are to be gained by the introspective practice it recommends, what responsibilities grasped, and what missteps avoided|
|Keywords||Introspection Mental Metaphysics Self Ryle, G|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Thomas Natsoulas (1970). Concerning Introspective "Knowledge&Quot;. Psychological Bulletin 73 (2):89-111.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2001). Mind Gauging: Introspection as a Public Epistemic Resource. PhilSci Archive.
Brie Gertler (2009). Introspection. In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Alfred C. Ewing (1953). Professor Ryle's Attack on Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 53:47-78.
Denis G. Arnold (1997). Introspection and its Objects. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):87-94.
Amy Kind (2003). Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.
Jeffery Geller (1988). Introspection in Psychology and Philosophy. Philosophy Research Archives 13:471-480.
Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (2012). Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Christopher S. Hill (1988). Introspective Awareness of Sensations. Topoi 7 (March):11-24.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #122,562 of 739,933 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,778 of 739,933 )
How can I increase my downloads?