Knowledge entails dispositional belief

Philosophical Studies 166 (1):19-50 (2013)
Knowledge is widely thought to entail belief. But Radford has claimed to offer a counterexample: the case of the unconfident examinee. And Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel have claimed empirical vindication of Radford. We argue, in defense of orthodoxy, that the unconfident examinee does indeed have belief, in the epistemically relevant sense of dispositional belief. We buttress this with empirical results showing that when the dispositional conception of belief is specifically elicited, people’s intuitions then conform with the view that knowledge entails (dispositional) belief.
Keywords Knowledge  Belief  Experimental philosophy  Radford  Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0052-z
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References found in this work BETA
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

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Citations of this work BETA
Lisa Miracchi (2015). Competence to Know. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.
James Beebe (2013). A Knobe Effect for Belief Ascriptions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):235-258.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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