David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 171 (3):481 - 497 (2009)
In a series of recent papers, Crispin Wright has developed and defended an epistemic account of borderline cases which he calls ‘Liberalism’. If Verdict Exclusion is the claim that no polar verdict on borderline cases is knowledgeable, then Liberalism implies the view that Verdict Exclusion is itself nothing we are in a position to know. It is a matter of ongoing discussion what more Liberalism implies. In any case, Wright argues that Liberalism affords the means to account for the intuition that polar verdicts on borderline cases are equally permissible. Here I argue that Liberalism fails to deliver and that an account of borderline cases based on Verdict Exclusion fares much better when it comes to showing that our ordinary practice of reaching verdicts on borderline cases is fully legitimate: all it needs is a reassessment of the nature of the claims such verdicts express.
|Keywords||Vagueness Borderline cases Entitlement Knowledge Internalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
Timothy Williamson (1994). Vagueness. Routledge.
Stephen R. Schiffer (2003). The Things We Mean. Oxford University Press.
Sven Rosenkranz (2007). Agnosticism as a Third Stance. Mind 116 (461):55-104.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Struan Jacobs (1990). Post‐Liberalism Vs. Temperate Liberalism. Critical Review 4 (3):365-375.
Michael Weinstock (2011). Knowledge-Telling and Knowledge-Transforming Arguments in Mock Jurors' Verdict Justifications. Thinking and Reasoning 17 (3):282 - 314.
Diana Raffman (2005). Borderline Cases and Bivalence. Philosophical Review 114 (1):1-31.
David W. Green & Rachel McCloy (2003). Reaching a Verdict. Thinking and Reasoning 9 (4):307 – 333.
R. Sorensen (2010). Borderline Hermaphrodites: Higher-Order Vagueness by Example. Mind 119 (474):393-408.
Dan López de Sa (2010). How to Respond to Borderline Cases. In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Oxford University Press
Patrick Greenough (2009). On What It is to Be in a Quandary. Synthese 171 (3):399 - 408.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #140,944 of 1,793,158 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #280,900 of 1,793,158 )
How can I increase my downloads?