Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 171 (3):481 - 497 (2009)
|Abstract||In a series of recent papers, Crispin Wright has developed and defended an epistemic account of borderline cases which he calls ‘Liberalism’. If Verdict Exclusion is the claim that no polar verdict on borderline cases is knowledgeable, then Liberalism implies the view that Verdict Exclusion is itself nothing we are in a position to know. It is a matter of ongoing discussion what more Liberalism implies. In any case, Wright argues that Liberalism affords the means to account for the intuition that polar verdicts on borderline cases are equally permissible. Here I argue that Liberalism fails to deliver and that an account of borderline cases based on Verdict Exclusion fares much better when it comes to showing that our ordinary practice of reaching verdicts on borderline cases is fully legitimate: all it needs is a reassessment of the nature of the claims such verdicts express.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Struan Jacobs (1990). Post‐Liberalism Vs. Temperate Liberalism. Critical Review 4 (3):365-375.
Michael Weinstock (2011). Knowledge-Telling and Knowledge-Transforming Arguments in Mock Jurors' Verdict Justifications. Thinking and Reasoning 17 (3):282 - 314.
Diana Raffman (2005). Borderline Cases and Bivalence. Philosophical Review 114 (1):1-31.
David W. Green & Rachel McCloy (2003). Reaching a Verdict. Thinking and Reasoning 9 (4):307 – 333.
R. Sorensen (2010). Borderline Hermaphrodites: Higher-Order Vagueness by Example. Mind 119 (474):393-408.
Dan López de Sa (2010). How to Respond to Borderline Cases. In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Oxford University Press.
Patrick Greenough (2009). On What It is to Be in a Quandary. Synthese 171 (3):399 - 408.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads14 ( #90,670 of 740,327 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,960 of 740,327 )
How can I increase my downloads?