Metacognition and higher-order thoughts

Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242 (2000)
Abstract
Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought (HOT) hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis
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Jonah Wilberg (2010). Consciousness and False HOTs. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):617-638.
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