David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242 (2000)
Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring speciﬁcally to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis.
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David M. Rosenthal (1993). Thinking That One Thinks. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell
Citations of this work BETA
Jacob Berger (2014). Consciousness is Not a Property of States: A Reply to Wilberg. Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.
Joëlle Proust (2007). Metacognition and Metarepresentation: Is a Self-Directed Theory of Mind a Precondition for Metacognition? [REVIEW] Synthese 159 (2):271 - 295.
Andy D. Mealor & Zoltan Dienes (2013). The Speed of Metacognition: Taking Time to Get to Know One's Structural Knowledge. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):123-136.
Jonah Wilberg (2010). Consciousness and False HOTs. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):617-638.
Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang (2008). Higher-Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):69-98.
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