Metacognition and higher-order thoughts
Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242 (2000)
| Abstract | Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought (HOT) hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis | |||||||||
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Robert Van Gulick (2004). Higher-Order Global States (Hogs): An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
Isabel Gois (2010). A Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Philosophia 38 (1).
Ned Block (2011). The Higher Order Approach to Consciousness is Defunct. Analysis 71 (3):419-431.
David Rosenthal (2004). Varieties of Higher-Order Theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
Gregory Minissale (2009). Enacting Higher Order Thoughts: Velazquez and Las Meninas. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):165-89.
Robert Francescotti (1995). Higher-Order Thoughts and Conscious Experience. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):239-254.
Katalin Balog (2000). Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT Theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.
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