Moore's paradox and Crimmins's case

Analysis 62 (274):167-171 (2002)
Moore’s paradox occurs with sentences, such as (1) It’s raining and I don’t think it’s raining. which are self-defeating in a way that prevents one from making an asser- tion with them.1 But Mark Crimmins has given us a case of a sentence that is syntactically just like (1) but is nonetheless assertible. Suppose I know somebody, and know or have excellent reason to believe that I know that very person under some other guise. I do not know what that other guise is, though I do know that I believe that the person I know under that other guise is an idiot.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00351
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David Rosenthal (2010). Expressing One's Mind. Acta Analytica 25 (1):21 - 34.

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