Moral responsibility and "moral luck"

Philosophical Review 104 (4):499-524 (1995)
Abstract
This paper argues that "moral luck," understood as a susceptibility of moral desert to lucky or unlucky outcomes, does not exist. The argument turns on the claim that epistemic inquiry is an indissoluble part of moral responsibility, and that judgment on the moral decision making of others should and can adjust for this fact; test cases which aim to isolate moral dilemmas from epistemic consideration misrepresent our moral experience. If the phenomena believed by some philosophers to exemplify "moral luck" as part of their explanation are analysed in the light of this insight, the case for "moral luck" dissolves
Keywords moral responsibility  moral luck  epistemic luck  altruism  moral judgment  culpability  negligence  moral desert  punishment  moral obligation
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David Enoch (2010). Moral Luck and the Law. Philosophy Compass 5 (1):42-54.
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