David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 74 (2):177-206 (2011)
We conceive of many general terms we use as having satisfaction conditions that are objective in that the thought that something meets them neither entails nor is entailed by the thought that we are currently in a position in which we are ready, or warranted, to apply those terms to it. How do we manage to use a given term in such a way that it is thereby endowed, and conceived to be endowed, with satisfaction conditions that are objective in this sense? In the first half of the paper, I present a number of interrelated problems for some extant metasemantical accounts of how use determines objective satisfaction conditions. In the second half, I then propose a novel account that avoids all of these problems
|Keywords||Philosophy Logic Ethics Ontology Epistemology Philosophy|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Peter Lipton (2004). Inference to the Best Explanation. Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jon Williamson, Motivating Objective Bayesianism: From Empirical Constraints to Objective Probabilities.
K. Danner Clouser (1986). Rationality in Medicine: An Explication. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 11 (2):185-205.
Alan H. Goldman (2008). The Case Against Objective Values. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):507 - 524.
Carl Hoefer (2007). The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic's Guide to Objective Chance. Mind 116 (463):549-596.
Tyler Burge (2009). Perceptual Objectivity. Philosophical Review 118 (3):285-324.
Christopher Peacocke (2001). Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):609-615.
Josefa Toribio (1997). Twin Pleas: Probing Content and Compositionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):871-89.
Alexander Miller (2003). Objective Content. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):73–90.
Alan Weir (2003). Objective Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (77):47-72.
Added to index2010-07-07
Total downloads55 ( #81,476 of 1,934,517 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #145,779 of 1,934,517 )
How can I increase my downloads?