Objective Content

Erkenntnis 74 (2):177-206 (2011)
We conceive of many general terms we use as having satisfaction conditions that are objective in that the thought that something meets them neither entails nor is entailed by the thought that we are currently in a position in which we are ready, or warranted, to apply those terms to it. How do we manage to use a given term in such a way that it is thereby endowed, and conceived to be endowed, with satisfaction conditions that are objective in this sense? In the first half of the paper, I present a number of interrelated problems for some extant metasemantical accounts of how use determines objective satisfaction conditions. In the second half, I then propose a novel account that avoids all of these problems
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
Categories No categories specified
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-010-9227-1
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