David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ratio Juris 16 (1):37-55 (2003)
This paper challenges recent influential arguments which would encourage legislators and courts to give weight to an assessment of the “evaluative judgements” expressed by the emotions which motivate crimes. While accepting the claim of Kahan and Nussbaum and others that emotions, other than moods, have intentional objects , and are not mere impulses which bypass cognition , it suggests the following criticisms of their analysis. First, the concept of an emotional “evaluative judgement” tends to elide the distinction between “judgements” that are merely the sense of an emotion, and do not have the character of acts, and deliberative emotional judgements that do resemble acts and so properly fall within the corrective scope of the law. Second, intentional emotions are empowered by pre–intentional psychological resources which are less amenable than intentional states to the agent's conscious supervision: The traditional recognition of “infirmity” in mitigation of crimes uncharacteristic of the criminal's overall conduct towards others is justified by the unpredictable action of these pre–intentional elements and can survive the abandonment of the mechanistic conception of emotion.
|Keywords||punishment evaluative judgements emotions mitigation intention|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
H. L. A. Hart (1970). Punishment and Responsibility. Philosophy 45 (172):162-162.
Arthur Schopenhauer (1958/1966). The World as Will and Representation. New York, Dover Publications.
R. A. Duff (1993). Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability. Law and Philosophy 12 (4):345 - 383.
Nicola Lacey (1994). State Punishment. Routledge.
Jeremy Horder (1993). Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 12 (2):193 - 215.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Raffaele Rodogno (2009). Shame, Guilt, and Punishment. Law and Philosophy 28 (5):429 - 464.
Christoph Jäger & Anne Bartsch (2006). Meta-Emotions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):179-204.
Elisa A. Hurley (2007). Working Passions: Emotions and Creative Engagement with Value. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):79-104.
Mark Devon (2006). The Origin of Emotions. Booksurge.
Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2012/2011). The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.
Jonathan H. Turner (2009). The Sociology of Emotions: Basic Theoretical Arguments. Emotion Review 1 (4):240-254.
Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2007). Emotions on the Net. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:31-36.
Keith Oatley & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2011). Basic Emotions in Social Relationships, Reasoning, and Psychological Illnesses. Emotion Review 3 (4):424-433.
Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.) (2008). The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.
Michael Clark & Peter Cave (2010). Nowhere to Run? Punishing War Crimes. Res Publica 16 (2):197-207.
Eva-Maria Engelen, Hans J. Markowitsch, Christian Scheve, Birgitt Roettger-Roessler, Achim Stephan, Manfred Holodynski & Marie Vandekerckhove (2009). Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes: Discipinary Debates and an Interdisciplinary Outlook. In Birgitt Röttger-Rössler & Hans Markowitsch (eds.), Emotions as Bio-cultural Processes.
Scott Alexander Howard (2012). Lyrical Emotions and Sentimentality. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):546-568.
Edmund T. Rolls (2004). What Are Emotions, Why Do We Have Emotions, and What is Their Computational Basis in the Brain? In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press
Added to index2010-09-02
Total downloads8 ( #266,667 of 1,724,771 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #268,625 of 1,724,771 )
How can I increase my downloads?