David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 75 (5):732-743 (2008)
Ontic structural realism (OSR) is crucially motivated by empirical discoveries of fundamental physics. To this extent its potential to furnish a general metaphysics for science may appear limited. However, OSR also provides a good account of the progress that has been achieved over the decades in a formalized special science, economics. Furthermore, this has a basis in the ontology presupposed by economic theory, and is not just an artifact of formalization. †To contact the author, please write to: 4th Floor, Humanities Building, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 900 13th Street South, Birmingham, AL 35294‐1260; School of Economics, Leslie Social Science Building, University of Cape Town, Private Bag, Rondebosch 7701, Cape Town, South Africa; e‐mail: email@example.com.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Steven French (2010). The Interdependence of Structure, Objects and Dependence. Synthese 175 (S1):89 - 109.
J. Wolff (2012). Do Objects Depend on Structures? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):607-625.
James Ladyman & Don Ross (2007). Ontic Structural Realism and the Philosophy of Physics. In , Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford University Press.
Luciano Floridi (2007). A Defence of Informational Structural Realism. Synthese 161 (2):219 - 253.
Peter Ainsworth (2011). Ontic Structural Realism and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Erkenntnis 75 (1):67-84.
Anjan Chakravartty, Ontological Priority: The Conceptual Basis of Non-Eliminative, Ontic Structural Realism.
Michael Esfeld (2009). The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):179 – 194.
Harold Kincaid (2008). Structural Realism and the Social Sciences. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):720-731.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads32 ( #44,971 of 1,004,675 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #22,154 of 1,004,675 )
How can I increase my downloads?