Peirce, Merleau-ponty, and perceptual experience: A Kantian heritage

Not only does peirce's theory of meaning as dispositional or as habit contain parallels with merleau-ponty's view of meaning in the structure of human behavior, but also both peirce and merleau-ponty alike attack reductivistic theories of perception. within this context, the present paper focuses on the use of kantian schemata in the philosophies of peirce and merleau-ponty, but to the extent that such incorporations are consistent with trends in pragmatism and phenomenology in general, it will reveal points of encounter not just between peirce and merleau-ponty but between pragmatism and phenomenology in general.
Keywords Epistemology pragmatism phenomenology kantianism
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DOI 10.5840/intstudphil198719363
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