Online research in philosophy

In the early eighteenth century context there was an intimate connection between problems concerning the existence of the material <span class='Hi'>world</span> and problems of natural religion. Two issues are of particular importance for understanding Hume’s irreligious intentions in the Treatise. First, if we are unable to establish that we know that the material <span class='Hi'>world</span> exists, then all arguments for the existence of God that presuppose knowledge of the material <span class='Hi'>world</span> (i.e. its beauty, order, design, etc.) are placed in doubt. Second, if we are naturally disposed to believe in the existence of body, but this belief is false, then it seems to follow that God must be a deceiver -- or does not exist. Hume’s arguments in 1.4.2, I maintain, are finely crafted to present both these (irreligious) challenges to the orthodox view.

We prove existence of mixed strategy equilibria for a class of discontinuous two-player games with non-compact strategy sets. As a corollary of our main results, we obtain a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria for the first- and second-price two-bidder auctions with toeholds. We also find Klemperer’s (2000) result about the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in the classical Bertrand duopoly.

In Faith, Reason and the Existence of God, Denys Turner defends the possibility of proving God’s existence on Christian and philosophical grounds. He responds to Kantian objections by developing a theory of reason derived from Thomas Aquinas. Turner’s work shifts the debate about God’s existence to the problem of determining which concept of reason is correct. I argue that this problem is extremely difficult and perhaps insoluble, because it requires using reason to resolve a dispute about reason. Consequently, Turner’s claims cannot be accepted without reservation.

This paper focuses on a combination of the antiskeptical strategies offered by semantic externalism and the inference to the best explanation. I argue that the most difficult problems of the two strategies can be solved, if the strategies are combined: The strategy offered by semantic externalism is successful against standard skeptical brain-in-a-vat arguments. But the strategy is ineffective, if the skeptical argument is referring to the recent-envatment scenario. However, by focusing on the scenario of recent envatment the most difficult problems of the antiskeptical strategy posed by the inference to the best explanation can be solved. The most difficult problems with this strategy are: (1) Why is an explanation of our experience offered by the skeptical hypothesis more complex than our standard explanation? (2) Why is the more complex explanation less likely to be true? By focussing on the recent envatment hypothesis both questions can be answered satisfactorily. Therefore, the combination of semantic externalism and the inference to the best explanation yields a powerful antiskeptical argument.

Basing his argument for the existence of God on the continuous nature of the temporal world, Braine here posits that the philosophy of religion cannot be continued as a separate discipline: the solution of its problems will be the fruit of the correct telesis of the problems of general philosophy in their complex interrelationships.

(DRAFT) It is commonplace that belief in possible worlds not only burdens one with a large ontology, but with metaphysical problems about their existence and identity conditions and epistemological problems about justifying belief in them. In this paper, we challenge these commonplaces, and show that belief in possible worlds doesn’t burden necessarily one with large ontology, nor with the mentioned metaphysical and epistemological problems. We argue specifically for the claim that the most fundamental existence principle of world theory is not only true in small models, but is derivable from analytically true principles. If this is true, it puts the lie to the commonplace view that a commitment to possible worlds entails a commitment to a large ontology. Moreover, the particular theory we use to support our claims precisely addresses the metaphysical problems about the existence and identity of worlds and offers a solution of the epistemological problem of justifying our belief in worlds.

Philosophical Propositions provides a fresh and lucid introduction to key philosophical problems in a classic style. Designed for students coming to philosophy for the first time, Jonathan Westphal introduces readers to the key problems in philosophy, encouraging them to work through those problems themselves. Each chapter considers a key philosophical problem: The Nature of a Philosophical Problem; Basic Concepts of Logic and Philosophy; The Problem of Evil; The Existence of God; Reality; Certainty; Time; Personal Identity; The Mind-Body Problem; Freewill and Determinism; The Meaning of Life? By asking students to consider key philosophical questions such as "are people free?", "can God's existence be proved?" and "how is the mind related to the body", this book provides a firm grounding in essential philosophical problems for students at any level.

This paper analyzes Berkeley's arguments for the existence of God in the Principles of Human Knowledge, Three Dialogues, and Alciphron. Where most scholarship has interpreted Berkeley as offering three quite distinct attempted proofs of God's existence, I argue that these are all variations on the strategy of inference to the best explanation. I also consider how this reading of Berkeley connects his conception of God to his views about causation and explanation.

"Philosophical discussion of the notion of existence, or being, has centered on two main problems which have not always been very clearly distinguished. First, there is the problem of what we are to say about the existence of fictitious objects, such as centaurs, dragons, and Pegasus; second, there is the problem of what we are t o say about the existence of abstract objects, such as qualities, relations, and numbers. Both problems have tempted philosophers to say that there are inferior sorts of existence a s well as the ordinary straightforward sort, and they therefore often suggest that we use the word "being" to cover both kinds but restrict "existence" to "being" of the common, non-fictitious, non-abstract sort. (Sometimes the term "reality" is proposed for "existence" or for "being.") T he problems of fiction and abstraction are different, how ever, for there are both real and fictitious abstractions. For example, the integer between two and four is real, but the integer between two and three is fictitious. On the other hand, there are both concrete and abstract fictions; for example, the winged horse of Bellerophon and the integer between two and three. Accordingly, philosophers have often dealt with the two problems in quite different ways and perhaps ought to do so. While these are the two main problems, there are others, f or example, that of what we are to say of the being of objects which have not yet begun, or have now ceased, to exist. The history of this subject, moreover, has been tangled with theological issues, to which it will be necessary to refer at certain points.".

In The Metaphysics of Creation and The Metaphysics of Theism, Norman Kretzmann defends an argument for God's existence which he claims to find in Aquinas. I assess this argument's key premise, a principle of sufficient reason, that: ‘PSR2: Every existing thing has a reason for its existence either in the necessity of its own nature or in the causal efficacy of some other beings’. PSR2 requires God's nature to explain His existence. Kretzmann does not tell us how this explanation is supposed to go. I examine such ways as I can envision that God's own nature might explain His existence. None pan out. I argue contra Kretzmann that if God is simple, as Aquinas understood this, His nature does not explain His existence, and while His existence is in itself per se notum (‘self-evident’) this does not entail that it has an explanation. If this is correct, we ought not to read Aquinas as committed to PSR2. Further, if I'm right that it's impossible for ‘the necessity of a thing's nature’ to explain its existence, PSR2 is true only if every existing thing has a reason for its existence in the causal efficacy of some other beings. So, if I'm right, theists ought to steer clear of PSR2, at least read in terms of genuine explanation. I finally offer a weaker reading of ‘a reason for its existence’ which does not generate the problems of the stronger reading Kretzmann seems to have in mind. This too, though, turns out to have its problems.