Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):789-789 (2003)
|Abstract||Byrne & Hilbert (2003; henceforth B&H) do not adequately explain how it is that phenomenal colors are physical, as their physicalism claims. This explanation requires more characterization of the relationship between the epistemology and nature of color than B&H provide. With this characterization, we can see that a physicalist need not accept unknowable color facts, as B&H do.|
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