Qualia and the senses

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511 (2001)
In his classic paper, "Some Remarks about the Senses," H. P. Grice argues that our intuitive distinction among perceptual modalities requires that the modalities be characterized in terms of the introspectible character of experience. I first show that Grice's argument provides support for the claim that perceptual experiences have qualia, namely, mental qualitative properties of experience which are what it's like to be conscious of perceived properties such as color. I then defend intentionalism about experience, which rejects qualia, by showing that we need not appeal to differences in qualia in order to distinguish the senses. Rather, I claim that we can appeal to, among other factors, differences in the physical properties of physical objects which experience represents
Keywords Experience  Metaphysics  Qualia  Senses  Grice, H P
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1980). Are Absent Qualia Impossible? Philosophical Review 89 (2):257-74.
C. A. J. Coady (1974). The Senses of Martians. Philosophical Review 83 (1):107-125.

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