David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 122 (485):43-84 (2013)
The phenomenon of disagreement has recently been brought into focus by the debate between contextualists and relativist invariantists about epistemic expressions such as ‘might’, ‘probably’, indicative conditionals, and the deontic ‘ought’. Against the orthodox contextualist view, it has been argued that an invariantist account can better explain apparent disagreements across contexts by appeal to the incompatibility of the propositions expressed in those contexts. This paper introduces an important and underappreciated phenomenon associated with epistemic expressions — a phenomenon that we call reversibility. We argue that the invariantist account of disagreement is incompatible with reversibility, and we go on to show that reversible sentences cast doubt on the putative data about disagreement, even without assuming invariantism. Our argument therefore undermines much of the motivation for invariantism, and provides a new source for constraints on the proper explanation of purported data about disagreement
|Keywords||Contextualism Relativism Disagreement John MacFarlane Andy Egan|
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References found in this work BETA
Seth Yalcin (2007). Epistemic Modals. Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
John MacFarlane (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
Adam Elga (2000). Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Analysis 60 (2):143–147.
Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies (2008). CIA Leaks. Philosophical Review 117 (1):77-98.
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Citations of this work BETA
Teresa Marques (2015). Retractions. Synthese:1-25.
Teresa Marques (2014). Relative Correctness. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):361-373.
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