Reality and imagination in political theory and practice: On Raymond Geuss’s realism

Abstract Can political theory be action-guiding without relying on pre-political normative commitments? I answer that question affirmatively by unpacking two related tenets of Raymond Geuss’ political realism: the view that political philosophy should not be a branch of ethics, and the ensuing empirically-informed conception of legitimacy. I argue that the former idea can be made sense of by reference to Hobbes’ account of authorization, and that realist legitimacy can be normatively salient in so far as it stands in the correct relation to a theory of justice and problematizes its sources of value through what Geuss terms ‘political imagination’.
Keywords Political Realism  Raymond Geuss  Authority  Legitimacy
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