David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Is rationality normative, in the sense that we ought to be rational, in our actions and attitudes? Recently, the claim that rationality is normative has faced several challenges. In this paper, I will take up these challenges, and aim to vindicate the normativity of rationality in the face of them. I will begin, in part 1, by outlining these challenges, and then discussing, and criticizing, some that have been offered to them in the literature. Then, in part 2, I will offer my own, unified response to these challenges
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Benjamin Kiesewetter (2016). You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.
Nicholas Southwood (2016). “The Thing To Do” Implies “Can”. Noûs 50 (1):61-72.
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