David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):195 - 209 (1995)
As G. E. Moore famously observed, sentences such as 'It's raining but I don't think it is', though they aren't contradictory, cannot be used to make coherent assertions.' The trouble with such sentences is not a matter of their truth conditions; such sentences can readily be true. Indeed, it happens often enough with each of us that we think, for example, that it isn't raining even though it is. This shows that such sentences are not literally contradictory. But even though such sentences have unproblematic truth conditions, we cannot say the same about their conditions of assertibility. There are no circumstances in which one can use such sentences to perform coherent assertoric speech acts. Situations exist in which these sentences would be true, but none in which anybody could use them to say so
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (2011). Moore's Paradox, Truth and Accuracy. Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255.
John N. Williams (2013). Moore's Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.
David Rosenthal (2010). Expressing One's Mind. Acta Analytica 25 (1):21 - 34.
Mitchell S. Green (1999). Moore's Many Paradoxes. Philosophical Papers 28 (2):97-109.
Johann Marek (2011). Expressing and Describing Experiences. A Case of Showing Versus Saying. Acta Analytica 26 (1):53-61.
Similar books and articles
Bernard W. Kobes (1995). Telic Higher-Order Thoughts and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 9:291-312.
Amy Kind (2003). Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.
Clayton Littlejohn (2010). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
John N. Williams (2004). Moore's Paradoxes, Evans's Principle and Self-Knowledge. Analysis 64 (284):348-353.
William S. Larkin (1999). Shoemaker on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 96 (3):239-52.
Sydney Shoemaker (1995). Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.
Rogers Albritton (1995). Comments on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):229-239.
Jordi Fernández (2005). Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.
John N. Williams (2006). Moore's Paradox and Conscious Belief. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads131 ( #15,783 of 1,725,449 )
Recent downloads (6 months)100 ( #6,158 of 1,725,449 )
How can I increase my downloads?