Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas

Philosophical Review 119 (4):411 - 447 (2010)
Currently, the most popular views about how to update de se or self-locating beliefs entail the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem.2 Another widely held view is that an agent‘s credences should be countably additive.3 In what follows, I will argue that there is a deep tension between these two positions. For the assumptions that underlie the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem entail a more general principle, which I call the Generalized Thirder Principle, and there are situations in which the latter principle and the principle of Countable Additivity cannot be jointly satisfied. The most plausible response to this tension, I argue, is to accept both of these principles, and to maintain that when an agent cannot satisfy them both, she is faced with a rational dilemma.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1215/00318108-2010-010
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,316
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Nick Tosh (2016). Finite Frequentism in a Big World. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):169-213.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

140 ( #30,211 of 1,926,181 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #197,585 of 1,926,181 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.