David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (2):115-140 (2005)
. Current debates concerning the concept of mental disorder involve many different philosophical issues. However, it is not always clear from these discussions how, or whether, these issues relate to one another, or in exactly what way they are important for the definition of disorder. This article aims to sort through some of the philosophical issues that arise in the current literature and provide a clarification of how these issues are related to one another and whether they are necessary for defining disorder. I argue that the main concern in defining disorder, namely demarcation, is obscured by a number of these other philosophical issues and that a focus on demarcation gives us a means of placing these other issues in a clarifying context.
|Keywords||demarcation essentialism evaluative sorting mental disorder nominalism kinds values|
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References found in this work BETA
Ian Hacking (1999). The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press.
Christopher Megone (2000). Mental Illness, Human Function, and Values. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 7 (1):45-65.
Abraham Rudnick (2000). The Ends of Medical Intervention and the Demarcation of the Normal From the Pathological. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 25 (5):569 – 580.
Thomas Stephen Szasz (2000). Second Commentary on" Aristotle's Function Argument". Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (1):3-16.
Citations of this work BETA
Daniel Buchman, Judy Illes & Peter Reiner (2011). The Paradox of Addiction Neuroscience. Neuroethics 4 (2):65-77.
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