David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 137 (3):301 - 333 (2008)
This paper argues that ‘that’-clauses are not singular terms (without denying that their semantical values are propositions). In its first part, three arguments are presented to support the thesis, two of which are defended against recent criticism. The two good arguments are based on the observation that substitution of ‘the proposition that p’ for ‘that p’ may result in ungrammaticality. The second part of the paper is devoted to a refutation of the main argument for the claim that ‘that’-clauses are singular terms, namely that this claim is needed in order to account for the possibility of quantification into ‘that’-clause position. It is shown that not all quantification in natural languages is quantification into the position of singular terms, but that there is also so-called ‘non-nominal quantification’. A formal analysis of non-nominal quantification is given, and it is argued that quantification into ‘that’-clause position can be treated as another kind non-nominal quantification.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy of Religion Philosophy of Mind Epistemology Logic Philosophy|
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen R. Schiffer (2003). The Things We Mean. Oxford University Press.
Wolfgang Künne (2003). Conceptions of Truth. Oxford University Press.
Friederike Moltmann (2003). Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions. Synthese 135 (1):77 - 118.
Agustin Rayo & Stephen Yablo (2001). Nominalism Through de-Nominalization. Noûs 35 (1):74–92.
Citations of this work BETA
Sean Crawford (2014). Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes? Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.
James Pryor (2007). Reasons and That‐Clauses. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):217-244.
Kevin Mulligan (2010). The Truth Predicate Vs the Truth Connective. On Taking Connectives Seriously. Dialectica 64 (4):565-584.
Giulia Felappi (2014). ‘In Defence of Sententialism’. Dialectica 68 (4):581-603.
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