The case against epistemic relativism: Reflections on chapter 6 of fear of knowledge

Episteme 4 (1):10-29 (2007)
Abstract
According to one sort of epistemic relativist, normative epistemic claims (e.g., evidence E justifies hypothesis H) are never true or false simpliciter, but only relative to one or another epistemic system. In chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian objects to this view on the ground that its central notions cannot be explained, and that it cannot account for the normativity of epistemic discourse. This paper explores how the dogged relativist might respond
Keywords epistemology   relativism
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References found in this work BETA
Jason Stanley (2000). Context and Logical Form. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (4):391--434.
Citations of this work BETA
Crispin Wright (2008). Fear of Relativism? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 141 (3):379 - 390.
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