The Irreducibility of Personal Obligation

Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):307 - 323 (2010)
It is argued that claims about personal obligation (of the form "s ought to 0") cannot be reduced to claims about impersonal obligation (of the form "it ought to be the case that p"). The most common attempts at such a reduction are shown to have unacceptable implications in cases involving a plurality of agents. It is then argued that similar problems will face any attempt to reduce personal obligation to impersonal obligation.
Keywords Personal obligation  Impersonal obligation  Meinong-Chisholm reduction  Ought  Deontic paradoxes
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DOI 10.2307/40784888
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Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar (2014). One Ought Too Many. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):102-124.

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