The Nature of Consciousness Handout

Abstract 1. To refute this theory: consciousness is intrinsic to being an intentional or sensory mental state; one cannot understand what it is for states to have sensory or intentional character without knowing what it is for those states to be conscious.
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    Similar books and articles
    David M. Rosenthal (1997). A Theory of Consciousness. In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. Mit Press.
    Gregg Caruso (2005). Sensory States, Consciousness, and the Cartesian Assumption. In Nathan Smith and Jason Taylor (ed.), Descartes and Cartesianism. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
    David J. Chalmers (2004). The Representational Character of Experience. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    John Barresi (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):77-93.

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