Two Problems of Moral Objectivity

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-62 (2001)
Two distinct problems of objectivity in moral theory are that of reference and truth and that of justification. These questions are often run together. However, it is possible to discuss the two questions separately. A defense is offered of moral ascriptions and moral properties, in opposition to the proposals of Mackie and Harman. But the thin or minimal defense of moral ascriptions leaves the second problem of objectivity unaddressed. Further argumentation leads to a proposal that claims limited moral objectivity
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DOI croatjphil20011124
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