'That' response doesn't work: Against a demonstrative defense of conceptualism
Noûs 44 (1):112-134 (2010)
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Gareth Evans (1982). The Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Robert Schroer (2010). Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.
Refeng Tang (2010). Conceptualism and the New Myth of the Given. Synthese 175 (1).
David Pereplyotchik (2011). Why Believe in Demonstrative Concepts? Consciousness and Cognition.
Brady Bowman (2011). A Conceptualist Reply to Hanna's Kantian Non-Conceptualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):417 - 446.
John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman (2011). A New Framework for Conceptualism. Noûs 45 (1):167-189.
Charlie Pelling (2007). Conceptualism and the Problem of Illusory Experience. Acta Analytica 22 (3):169-182.
James Higginbotham (2003). Jackendoff's Conceptualism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):680-681.
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