The supervenience of biological concepts

Philosophy of Science 45 (3):368-386 (1978)
In this paper the concept of supervenience is employed to explain the relationship between fitness as employed in the theory of natural selection and population biology and the physical, behavioral and ecological properties of organisms that are the subjects of lower level theories in the life sciences. The aim of this analysis is to account simultaneously for the fact that the theory of natural selection is a synthetic body of empirical claims, and for the fact that it continues to be misconstrued, even by biologists, for a tautological system. The notion of supervenience is then employed to provide a new statement of the relation of Mendelian predicates to molecular ones in order to provide for the commensurability and potential reducibility of Mendelian to molecular genetics in a way that circumvents the theoretical complications which appear to stand in the way of such a reduction
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/288813
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Michael T. Ghiselin (1981). Categories, Life, and Thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):269.
Raphael Falk (1986). What is a Gene? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 17 (2):133-173.

View all 35 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

41 ( #80,617 of 1,725,168 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #110,393 of 1,725,168 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.