The supervenience of biological concepts

Philosophy of Science 45 (3):368-386 (1978)
Abstract In this paper the concept of supervenience is employed to explain the relationship between fitness as employed in the theory of natural selection and population biology and the physical, behavioral and ecological properties of organisms that are the subjects of lower level theories in the life sciences. The aim of this analysis is to account simultaneously for the fact that the theory of natural selection is a synthetic body of empirical claims, and for the fact that it continues to be misconstrued, even by biologists, for a tautological system. The notion of supervenience is then employed to provide a new statement of the relation of Mendelian predicates to molecular ones in order to provide for the commensurability and potential reducibility of Mendelian to molecular genetics in a way that circumvents the theoretical complications which appear to stand in the way of such a reduction
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,631
External links
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Harold Kincaid (1987). Supervenience Doesn't Entail Reducibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):343-56.
    Jaegwon Kim (1984). Concepts of Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
    Brian P. McLaughlin (1995). Varieties of Supervenience. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    Bradford Petrie (1987). Global Supervenience and Reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (September):119-30.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    22 ( #56,076 of 548,972 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    4 ( #19,222 of 548,972 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums